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DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
The reasoning employed by some of the courts in this area of the law is
unrealistic and psychologically unsound. Where the state has in some ex-
trinsic manner intensified or exaggerated the grisly aspects of an occur-
rence and attempts to introduce photographs of such conditions to the
prejudice of the defendant, the growing trend is to repulse these efforts.
It would appear to be the more enlightened view.
JOINT TENANCY-COMMON LAW REQUIREMENT OF
FOUR UNITIES HELD NOT NECESSARY TO CREATE
JOINT TENANCY IN STOCK CERTIFICATES
The decedent owned shares of stock in several corporations. In 1948
and 1950, he transferred the shares into his and defendant's name as "joint
tenants with the right of survivorslip and not as tenants in common." The
transfer was accomplished by direct assignment executed in writing on
the back of the stock certificate and signed by the decedent. Plaintiff, the
decedent's widow, sought a declaratory judgment to fix ownership of
these shares in her. Plaintiff contended that her husband had failed to
create a joint tenancy because the common law requisites of unity of time
and unity of title were not present in the transfer. The court of appeals,
per Justice Finnegan, affirmed the decision of the district court holding
for the defendant; and ruled that the transfer did create a valid joint
tenancy, apparently basing its decision on the construction of an Illinois
statute' and the interpretation of a prior Illinois Supreme Court decision.2
Petri v. Rhein, 257 F. 2d 268 (C.A. 7th, 1958).
The issue thus raised by the instant case is whether a joint tenancy in
personal property may be created without first conveying to a strawman3
and then reconveying to the joint tenants.
At common law and in Illinois, a joint tenancy in personal property
was recognized 4 when the unities of time and title were both present.5 A
joint tenancy by operation of law could never be created.6 The unities
were necessary so that both parties could gain equal interests at the same
time. If one merely transferred part of the interest to another, it was con-
1 Il. Rev. Stat. (1957) c. 76.
2 Hood v. Commonwealth Trust & Savings Bank, 376 111. 413, 34 N.E.2d 414 (1941).
3 A strawman in the language of real estate brokers is a mere conduit or medium for
the convenience in holding and passing title. Van Raalte v. Epstein, 202 Mo. 173, 99
S.W. 1077 (1906).
4 Re Estate of Jirovec, 285 Ill. App. 499, 2 N.E. 354 (1936); Staples v. Berry, 110 Me.
32, 85 A. 303 (1912); Deslauriers v. Senesac, 331 Ill. 427, 163 N.E. 327 (1928); Case v.
Owen, 139 Ind. 22, 38 N.E. 395 (1894); Neal v. Neal, 194 Ark. 226, 106 S.W.2d 595
(1937).
5 Ibid. 6 Deslauriers v. Senesac, 311 11.437, 163 N.E. 327 (1928).
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strued that the transferor still had his original interest. If, however, the
transferor conveyed his property to a stravman and the stravman then
reconveyed to the original transferor and his chosen joint tenant, the
interests of both parties would be acquired at the same time.
Various states have obviated the necessity for the unities by abolishing
the need for strawmien through legislation 7 or judicial decisions.8 In Illi-
nois, the problem has been in a constant state of confusion for the past
century; the basic issue being whether the unities need be present in order
to effectuate a transfer of personal property into a joint tenancy. Prior to
the 1941 case of Hood v. Commonwealth Trust and Savings Bank,9 most
Illinois decisions required the presence of all four of the unities. The
court, in the Hood case, dispensed with the need of the unities by saying:
[W]hen one of the stockholders transferred his shares to the bank for
reconveyance and a new certificate was issued to the stockholder and wife as
joint tenants and not as tenants in common . . . the transfer started a new
period of stock ownership. 1°
In 1949, In re Wilson Estate," in dicta, indicated that the unities had to
be present in order to create a joint tenancy in personal property. Thus,
the problem became more in flux than ever. The Wilson case held that the
words of creation had to be explicit, "as joint tenants and not as tenants
in common." It has been held, however, that as long as the intention can
be realized, exact words are not necessary for the creation of such an
estate.1
2
It soon became obvious that the necessity of making two conveyances
through the use of the strawman in order to create a joint tenancy only
led to unnecessary record keeping, dual costs and great inconvenience to
all concerned. This burden plus the uncertainty of the law on the point,
led the Illinois legislature to pass a statute' effective July 1, 1953, which
sanctioned the creation of a joint tenancy without the use of the straw-
man.'1
Section 2.1 of the Joint Rights and Obligations Act 14 seems at first
reading to be the basis of the decision in the instant case, but the applica-
tion of simple arithmetic indicates that this is not so. The conveyances in
question were made three and five years before the effective date of
Section 2.1. Therefore, the statute did not affect these transactions since
7 Mass. Laws Ann. (1950) c. 184, § 8; Missouri Rev. Laws (1952) c. 442, § 24; Tenn.
Stat. (1949) c. 255; Utah Code Ann. (1953) § 57-1-5.
8 Edge v. Brown, 316 Mass. 104, 55 N.E.2d 5 (1944); Boehninger v. Schmid, 254 N.Y.
355, 173 N.E. 220 (1930); Therrien v. Therrien, 94 N. H. 66, 46 A.2d 538 (1946).
9 376 Ill. 413, 34 N.E.2d 414 (1941).
10 Ibid., at 424, 420. 11 404 111. 207, 88 N.E.2d 662 (1949).
12Lindner Boyden Bank v. Wardop, 291 Ill. App. 454, 10 N.E.2d 144 (1937).
1 3111. Rev. Stat. (1957) c. 76, § 2.1. 14 Ibid.
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the statute was not retroactive to past conveyances and had no life until
1953. The Petri case was decided on the strength of Judge Murphy's
words in the Hood case, indicating that the surrender of a stock certificate
to the corporation and the issuance of a new certificate to the parties as
joint tenants was sufficient to satisfy the need for the four unities:
To create an estate in joint tenancy it is necessary that there be unity of
interest, unity of title, unity of time and unity of possession .... We assume
• . . that the transfer of the stock was effected under circumstances to meet
the requirements of section 2 of the Joint Rights and Obligations Act to create
a joint estate in personal property, but when Otto E. Lucius surrendered the
first certificate and caused the second to issue to him and his wife as joint
tenants, he thereby terminated all title in the stock evidenced by the *first
certificate and thereafter held as a joint tenant with his wife. To create thejoint estate it was essential that his interest as a joint tenant be created at the
same time as that of his co-tenant, for if it be otherwise there would be nojoint tenancy. By the creation of the joint estate the contractual relationship
of Otto Lucius to the bank and its depositors was changed from that of an
individual to that of a joint tenant. From the date he acquired his stock....
to the date of the surrender of the certificate . . . constituted one period of
ownership and from the date of the establishment of the joint tenancy ... to
the date the bank was closed constituted another period of ownership .... 15
Thus, the effect of the Petri case is to dispense with the illogical and
cumbersome requirement of using a strawman in creation of joint tenan-
cies in stock certificates.
15 Hood v. Commonwealth Trust & Savings Bank, 376 l. 413, 423, 424, 34 N.E.2d 414,
420,421 (1941).
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-FAILURE OF CITY POLICE
TO PROTECT INFORMER HELD ACTIONABLE
NEGLIGENCE
Arnold Shuster, plaintiff's intestate, after studying an F.B.I. flyer, sup-
plied information to the New York City police which led to the arrest
of Willie Sutton, a notorious and dangerous fugitive. Three weeks later,
the decedent, on a public highway near his home, was shot and killed by
a person or persons unknown. Shuster's part in the arrest had been widely
publicized and as a result, he had received letters and telephone calls threat-
ening his life, of which he notified the police. Limited protection was at
first given Shuster, only to be terminated shortly thereafter because the
police felt that the threats were the work of cranks. The administrator of
Shuster's estate sought damages from the city for the alleged negligence
of the police in failing to provide Shuster adequate protection in view of
his known status as an informer upon a criminal who, as a matter of com-
mon knowledge, was of a dangerous nature and who was known to have
